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3 TOWARD OPEN SOURCE NANO:
5 ARSENIC REMOVAL AND
7 ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF
9 TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
11

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17 **ABSTRACT**

19 *In the wake of growing pressures to make scholarly knowledge*
21 *commercially relevant via translation into intellectual property, various*
23 *techno-scientific communities have mobilized to create open access/open*
25 *source experiments. These efforts are based on the ideas and success of*
27 *free and open source software, and generally try to exploit two salient*
29 *features: increased openness and circulation, and distributed collective*
31 *innovation. Transferring these ideas from software to science often*
33 *involves unforeseen challenges, one of which is that these movements can*
be deemed, often incorrectly, as heretical by university administrators and
technology transfer officers who valorize metrics such as number of
patents filed and granted, spin-off companies created, and revenue
generated. In this paper, we discuss nascent efforts to foster an open
source movement in nanotechnology and provide an illustrative case of an
arsenic removal invention. We discuss challenges facing the open source

35 **Measuring the Social Value of Innovation: A Link in the University Technology Transfer and**
37 **Entrepreneurship Equation**

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1 *nano movement that include making a technology widely accessible and*
2 *the associated politics of metrics.*

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5 How scientific knowledge is created, translated into innovative technologies,
6 and used to enhance the welfare of economy and society are core issues
7 facing policy makers, government officials, community leaders, as well as
8 administrators in universities, research institutes, and corporations. Over
9 the past couple of decades, observers and scholars of innovation systems
10 have noted that the social organization of innovation has shifted away from
11 the linear development model (i.e., the creation of basic science in academia
12 enabling technology development in industry) to a much more interpenetrated
13 model of techno-science that is marked by hybridized arrangements
14 and bidirectional flows between university and industry (Rhoten & Powell,
15 2007; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986). This has been catalyzed by the rise of
16 biotechnology and legislation such as the Bayh-Dole Act that allowed
17 University ownership of inventions created using federal research funds (see
18 Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, & Ziedonis, 2004), leading to the increased
19 penetration of commercial interests and pressures into the sacred halls of
20 academia (e.g., Slaughter & Leslie, 1999; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Vallas
21 & Kleinman, 2007; Mirowski & Sent, 2002). These developments have
22 dovetailed with the more general rise of neoliberal policies and thought
23 throughout much of the developed and developing world, leading to the
24 valorization of market logics in many societal spheres (McMichael, 1996).

25 In academia, the growing allure of intellectual property and private
26 funding has, in turn, led to a breakdown of the line demarcating public
27 science and proprietary control of inventions via intellectual property. Most
28 research universities have a technology transfer office (TTO) and formal
29 policies that mandate that scientists are to report all inventions to those
30 offices. In turn, TTOs aim to generate revenue for the university via
31 licensing of patents and the creation of spin-out entrepreneurial ventures. As
32 a result, TTO effectiveness and success is assessed based on metrics such as
33 number of patents filed and granted, number of patents licensed, spin-off
34 companies created and overall revenue generated. Despite the growing
35 efforts of university administrators to valorize such metrics, the reality is
36 that most TTOs have great difficulty generating enough revenue to support
37 their operations, let alone contribute to university coffers (see Trune &
38 Goslin, 1998). More generally, the move toward rationalization, monitoring,
39 and “audit culture” has been identified within the university as one

1 reason for the displacement of a commitment to a public-oriented mission
(Strathern, 2000).

3 In addition, there is growing disquiet regarding the historic openness of
4 academic science and technology and the ability of the general public and
5 marginalized people to access its insights to solve localized problems (e.g.,
6 see Sampat, 2003). For instance, some have claimed that patents, in areas
7 such as the life sciences, have inhibited innovation (Heller & Eisenberg,
8 1998), information sharing among researchers (e.g., Eisenberg, 1996; but
9 see Walsh, Cohen, & Arora, 2003 and Walsh, Cho, & Cohen, 2005),
10 and productive university–industry relationships (Leaf & Burke, 2005).
11 In addition, the valorization of market logics threatens to limit efforts in
12 directions that might have high *social value* but less commercial potential,
13 such as in the development of medicines and solutions to problems in
14 geographic areas with large populations and high rates of disease and
15 poverty. Rhoten and Powell (2007) remark that:

17 Traditionally, university settings explored arenas that industry did not pursue. But in the
18 absence of market incentives, it is not obvious where knowledge generation for the
19 public interest and social good may emerge in areas such as vaccines or low-cost
20 technologies. In some circumstances, new models of public and proprietary science have
21 fostered the development of first-to-the-world medicines and affordable communications
22 technologies, but in other realms, such as renewable energy, widely available
23 breakthroughs have not been forthcoming.

23 Such longer-term distributional consequences of private models of
24 scientific innovation becoming hegemonic over more public domain models
25 have deservedly opened up scrutiny into these issues. Civil society
26 organizations such as the *ETC Group*, *Greenpeace*, *Friends of the Earth*,
27 and the *Pesticide Action Network* have stressed the importance of taking
28 inequalities (e.g., North/South divide) into account when assessing how
29 science can benefit society. Such organizations may be characterized as
30 techno-skeptics, deploying different cultural framings (Lounsbury & Glynn,
31 2001) than techno-optimists or techno-realists (see ETC, 2005). *Techno-*
32 *optimists* tend to be functionalists in the sense of believing in the utility of
33 technological development to contribute to societal growth and develop-
34 ment without much downside – it is generally viewed that industry and
35 scientists are trustworthy actors that can voluntarily handle risks (e.g.,
36 toxicity of chemicals and materials) in a responsible way (recall the
37 Responsible Care program in the US Chemical Industry).

38 *Techno-realists* believe that technology can contribute to “pro-poor”
39 applications such as solar power, water clean-up, or cheap vaccines, but
40 requires “upstream engagement” to enable broader societal participation

1 and oversight with regard to the development and governance of technology
(see Wynne, 1995; Guston & Sarewitz, 2006). *Techno-skeptics* put justice
3 ahead of technology and are wary of overpromising technological advance
and ignoring the history of unintended consequences of nuclear, biotech,
5 and chemical technologies. These techno-skeptics view technology as
inextricably bound up in power relations – enhancing the wealth and
7 control of elites and Western corporations while failing to adequately
address core issues of poor peoples (see Frickel & Moore, 2006 on the
9 variegated politics of science and technology). Many techno-skeptics are
organized as social movement organizations that try to influence public
11 policy, regulations, and discourse. While some are more radical than others,
calling for a moratorium on nanotechnology development (e.g. Bill Joy),
13 others are more pragmatic and work with techno-realists to construct
progressive alternatives to the prevailing commercial logic that dominates
15 nanotechnology policy.

These disparate views of technological development and the growing
17 commercialization in science do not map easily onto science, industry, and
civil society. Many scientists and engineers in different fields may consider
19 themselves techno-skeptics or techno-realists, whereas many civil society
actors can be techno-optimists with respect to information and commu-
21 nication technology, but skeptics with respect to genetically modified
organisms or nanotechnology. Thus, it is not surprising that alternative
23 possibilities for the governance of techno-scientific development have
emerged both within universities and beyond them. Perhaps the most
25 influential alternative model has been free and open source software (FOSS), which has inspired scientists and other scholars beyond the domain
27 of software to mobilize countermovements (e.g., Everts, 2006; Rai, 2005).
For instance, *Creative Commons* was created in 2001 to give authors more
29 flexible control over licensing and use of copyrighted creative works while
maximizing public access. Members of Creative Commons subsequently
31 created *Science Commons* in 2005 to remove unnecessary legal and technical
barriers to scientific collaboration and innovation. “Built on the promise of
33 Open Access to scholarly literature and data, Science Commons identifies
and eases key barriers to the movement of information, tools and data
35 through the scientific research cycle” (<http://sciencecommons.org/>, October 3,
2007).

37 In other areas of science, most notably biology, there have been small
moves toward applying alternative models. Within the corporate pharma-
39 ceutical world, the single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) Consortium is
often heralded as one example of a limited form of sharing that enables

1 innovation (Sachidanandam et al., 2001). In 1996, Nobel Prize winning
2 biologist Sydney Brenner created the *Molecular Sciences Institute* in
3 Berkeley as an independent, nonprofit research laboratory that combines
4 genomic experimentation with computer modeling. Recently, Molecular
5 Sciences has identified itself as an actor in the open source biology
6 movement devoted to publishing its results in the open access literature and
7 offering freely available data, reagents, and methods to researchers.
8 OpenWetWare and the Biobricks (<http://openwetware.org> and [http://](http://www.biobricks.org/)
9 www.biobricks.org/ respectively) foundation at MIT are part of an effort
10 to make the field of “synthetic biology” open source through the sharing of
11 laboratory methods and the creation of a registry of “standardized parts”
12 for doing engineering with biological parts. Similar initiatives include
13 *Synaptic Leap* and the *Institute of OneWorld Health*. In addition, various
14 banking and professional organizations also have begun to consider open
15 source-inspired alternatives such as *GenBank* and *Chemists Without Borders*.
16 Members of such communities believe that open source approaches can
17 enable complex problem solving in areas where narrow profit-driven
18 research is seen to have failed (Kepler et al., 2006).

19 In this paper, we document some nascent efforts to create and catalyze an
20 open source nanotechnology movement – OS Nano (see [http://open-](http://open-sourcenano.net)
21 [sourcenano.net](http://open-sourcenano.net)) – that seeks to open up the process of experimentation in
22 nanotechnology by finding ways to “vernacularize” the high-tech, expensive
23 practices conducted in the lab. Over the past two decades, nanotechnology
24 has emerged as a critical area for scientific and commercial development,
25 driven both by the scientific community and industry, and also national
26 governments around the globe. The field of potential applications in
27 nanotechnology, supported by a wide panoply of actors (optimist, realist,
28 and skeptic), ranges from key technological advances for national defense
29 to transformative social and economic applications. The nano race was
30 prominently kicked off with the National Nanotechnology Initiative
31 authorized by President Clinton in 2000. Seeded with \$500 million in
32 2001, the US government has continued to increase the pot, reaching the \$1
33 billion threshold by 2005. Western Europe and Japan also invest hundreds
34 of millions of dollars every year.

35 The prefix “nano” indicates that research and application are focused on
36 innovations at the nanometer scale – a billionth of a meter (1/75,000th the
37 width of a human hair). What makes research in this area innovative is not
38 just that it is small, but that at this scale, materials exhibit properties that
39 they don’t at human scales. Gold, for instance, can appear red when it is less
40 than 100 nm in size. Most researchers in nanotechnology have some kind of

1 engineering interest – they are interested in harnessing the properties of
2 these materials to do something, rather than simply seeking to understand
3 them. The US National Nanotechnology Initiative defines nanotechnology
4 not just as the study of these properties, but their exploitation as well ([http://](http://www.nano.gov/html/facts/whatIsNano.html)
5 www.nano.gov/html/facts/whatIsNano.html). Essential to this mission are a
6 wide range of disciplines, tools, and approaches, drawing upon knowledge
7 in physics, chemistry, chemical engineering, biology, biological engineering,
8 environmental science, environmental engineering, medical research, molec-
9 ular biology, electrical engineering, surface science and surface chemistry,
10 and materials science. Commercial interest in nanotechnology has driven
11 many of the current applications that extend existing commercial research
12 areas such as more durable tennis balls, lighter and stronger tennis rackets
13 and golf clubs, stain-resistant clothing, wear-resistant tires, cosmetics and
14 sunscreens. The Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies sponsored by the
15 Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars has catalogued over 500 manufact-
16 urer-identified nanotechnology-based consumer products currently on the
17 market (see <http://www.nanotechproject.org/44>).

18 Techno-optimists promulgate dramatic, visionary narratives of nano-
19 technological potential such as space elevators (cables made of carbon
20 nanotubes that stretch into space) (Pugno, 2006), tiny robots that enter the
21 body to attack tumors or clean up the environment, and computers made
22 entirely of nanoscale components. As part of this techno-optimistic imagery,
23 key technology policy-makers across the globe have additionally empha-
24 sized that such nanotechnology developments will provide a powerful engine
25 for economic growth that will benefit all peoples (e.g., Roco & Bainbridge,
26 2001; see Berube, 2006 for a somewhat critical view on nanotechnology
27 hype). Techno-skeptics have suggested other kinds of visionary uses, such as
28 materials for water treatment and soil remediation, cheap noninvasive
29 diagnostics, and other uses that might contribute to the Millennium
30 Development Goals of the UN (Salamanca-Buentello et al., 2005). Techno-
31 realists are interested in all possibilities, but focus more on the pathways by
32 which technologies get developed for use.

33 From a techno-realist perspective, if nanotechnologies are to really
34 contribute to the enhancement of societal welfare across the rich/poor and
35 North/South divides, while also helping to facilitate economic growth and
36 development more broadly, it is important to evaluate the various
37 mechanisms by which such seemingly conflicting goals might be balanced.
38 As alluded to earlier, a profit maximization focus at the inventor level
39 currently provides the dominant model for policy and governance.
40 However, such a model rewards primarily those applications that can

1 drive metrics of commercial return and intellectual property rights
acquisition.

3 While the commercial model does not preclude the possibility of
economic gain from socially beneficial uses, the metrics and models of
5 profit and IPR force them to focus there. An open source approach provides
an alternative model and set of mechanisms that emphasizes collective
7 benefits and goals. At a very basic level, open source models reward *re-use* –
they reward people whose ideas and technologies are most widely used by
9 distributing credit and attribution to the individuals who create and
contribute. This re-distribution of social capital and reputation is often
11 sufficient incentive to participate, and the widespread use of an idea is seen
as a metric of its success (Weber, 2005; Feller, Fitzgerald, Hissam, &
13 Lakhani, 2005). The current reality, however, is that since profit-maximizing
models of nanotechnology are dominant, alternative approaches will have
15 little impact unless they are voiced, adequately theorized, and articulated
with well understood and accepted metrics.

17 Open source possibilities are important in the context of nanotechnology
because such an approach can help focus more directly on goals such as
19 regional economic growth or innovativeness, as well as *use value* of techno-
logy by peoples near and far. This is in contrast to *exchange value* metrics
21 such as patents awarded, start-ups created, and revenues generated that
dominate current university TTO thinking and are rooted in the inventor-
23 entrepreneur model of profit maximization (see Mars, Slaughter, & Rhoades,
Forthcoming). While the profit-maximization model can also contribute to
25 the achievement of collective outcomes, it is unclear if it is the best model, or
at least whether it is the only model that should be utilized. In fact, it may be
27 that a stringent IP focus may be appropriate for the development of some
innovations, while open source approaches may be more efficacious for
29 others. If we begin to understand better how to measure the social value of
innovations, open source models could expand the range of how universities
31 account for innovation success, enabling the accrual of credits for helping to
improve the quality of life of impacted populations and, more broadly,
33 society.

However, the open source model is not particularly well understood yet.
35 In particular, the experimental use of the model in domains other than
software, such as biology and nanotechnology, has only been systematically
37 studied recently by one of the authors (Kelty, 2008). In the next section,
we outline the components that make FOSS work, and show how they
39 might be modulated for use in the general area of nanotechnology, including
the limitations of doing so. We then present a case of a specific technology

1 related to arsenic removal that was invented by chemists at Rice University,
the first candidate for an open source nanotechnology project. We conclude
3 with a discussion of the implications of open source nano techno-science for
current policy and governance of university science and technology
5 commercialization.

7 9 **EXPLORING OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE**

Current intellectual property systems are based on the premise that forms of
11 IP such as patents provide crucial incentives for the production of useful and
commercially relevant knowledge. However, the success of open source
13 software has shown that the individual incentive model rooted in
competitive individualism and profit maximization is not the only route to
15 increasing innovation. These new experiments are rooted in collective
approaches to knowledge creation that assume that the common resources
17 produced do not get depleted by individual use. Knowledge commons,
therefore, differ markedly from the kinds of commons that have historically
19 been the focal point of scholarly discussions in economic and legal studies
(see Murray & O'Mahony, 2007); commons such as pastures, forests, and
21 fisheries where resources can be depleted through individual use, resulting
in market failure – the classic “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968,
23 see also Rose, 1986; Boyle, 2003).

FOSS is an exemplary case of a functioning commons that enables
25 widespread availability by providing legally sound protections that create
incentives for cumulative innovation and collective benefit, in contrast to
27 narrow self-interest seeking behavior and aggregate resource depletion.
A number of studies have explored the implications for theories of collective
29 action and economic theory (Weber, 2005; Benkler, 2006; Lerner & Tirole,
2002). Here, however, we focus on the core practices of FOSS in order to
31 understand in detail what makes it work: (1) shared source code, (2) a
defining and standardized open infrastructure, (3) a set of legal tools for
33 dealing with IP law, (4) a set of software tools for managing distributed
collective work on source code, and (5) a social movement or ideology that
35 gives meaning to the four other practices (Kelty, 2008). Each of these
components is necessary for FOSS to function, but there can be a great deal
37 of variation within them depending on the goals and people involved.

These five components are described in more detail in this section, along
39 with some speculations about how nanotechnology poses new challenges to
the model, and how those challenges might be met by “modulating” the

1 existing practices to see whether the principles and practices translate to new
2 domains. Often modulating one component changes others; for instance,
3 when “source code” no longer refers to software per se, but includes things
4 like film or music or scientific data, it is often necessary to revisit the relevant
5 licenses, the relevant infrastructures, and the relevant modes of collabora-
6 tion in order to ask whether “open source” is possible in the same manner.
7

9 *Source Code is the Basis for FOSS*

11 Source code is the human-readable version of the software, not the version
12 that actually runs on a computer, which is compiled from the source code
13 and referred to as the binary or executable. Shared source code allows people
14 in distinct locales, using similar machines to compile, install, read, change,
15 and re-compile the software. Without such shared source code, users would
16 share something they could not easily learn from or change, somewhat like
17 sharing a piece of recorded music instead of a playable piece of sheet music.
18 Needless to say, as in the case of playing music, changing and compiling
19 source code requires a lot of skill; however, most FOSS users gain that skill
20 precisely by downloading, studying, and experimenting with source code.
21 A great deal of very high-quality source code has circulated for almost
22 30 years. Examples that predate FOSS include the UNIX operating system,
23 upon which Linux was modeled, the TeX typesetting language, the LISP
24 Programming language, all of which circulated with the source code intact,
25 allowing people to examine and learn from it. Facilitating such forms of
26 learning is a very common part of Internet culture as well, exemplified by the
27 fact that a “View Source” command is standard in all browsers.

28 By contrast, proprietary software vendors have always sought to keep
29 source code secret because it represents their intellectual property, trade
30 secrets, and sometimes the key to their competitive advantage. However,
31 keeping source code secret necessitates employing a much larger staff of
32 people, internal to a corporation, who can fix bugs, respond to user
33 complaints, address new demands and needs, update and check the software
34 as it goes through new versions, and so forth. In the FOSS model, such
35 activities are often handled in a distributed fashion by the users themselves,
36 under the theory that “given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow”
37 (Raymond, 2001).

38 What is the source code of nanotechnology? Given that nanotechnology is
39 an inherently interdisciplinary endeavor, there may be several answers to
40 this question. In the domain of engineering, it may include designs,

1 schematics, or actual source code for software related to an engineered
2 material. In materials chemistry (the domain we explore in our case study),
3 the source code is probably best understood as a recipe for the synthesis of a
4 material – in particular, it is a set of detailed instructions for necessary
5 materials and steps in the process of synthesis. Whatever form it takes,
6 however, it needs to be easy to share, easy (and legal) to modify, and should
7 encourage reciprocal contribution of new ideas and collective learning.
8 Without such circulation it simply becomes a static publication of a method.
9

11 *An Open and Standard Infrastructure is Essential to FOSS*

13 In terms of software, the definition of what constitutes a properly “open”
14 infrastructure includes all those standards necessary to create software: the
15 personal computer with an open architecture, the Internet with its open
16 protocols and less often noted, but equally important, a shared pedagogical
17 tradition among hackers and computer scientists. Both the Internet and the
18 personal computer represent de facto standards upon which FOSS creators
19 can rely: software can be made to compile across all machines, with a limited
20 amount of architectural variation (thanks in no small part to the near
21 monopoly of chip-maker Intel) and can easily be shared and transported on
22 the Internet using freely available tools. It is not an accident that FOSS
23 emerged with such force only after the Internet became the de facto standard
24 for Internetworking. Without such standard definitions of “openness,” it
25 would be impossible to reliably replicate FOSS around the world and on
26 millions of machines.

27 When considering the applicability of the FOSS model to different
28 domains, it is therefore important to distinguish between the specific
29 characteristics of shareable and re-usable software source code and the
30 extensive, standardized infrastructure that allows it to circulate. Many
31 people suggest that FOSS is possible because of the unique characteristics of
32 source code. For instance, one might argue that the test of whether software
33 “works” is whether it compiles, and this is taken to be an essential feature of
34 software as such. A film, it is suggested, “works” for different reasons (e.g.,
35 the director’s vision) and cannot meet the same test and therefore it makes
36 no sense to make “open source film.” The reason code compiles, however,
37 has as much to do with the extrinsic and extensive nature of the
38 infrastructure (the Internet, standard PC architecture, freely available
39 compilers) that allows it to circulate as it does its intrinsic qualities.
Similarly, the question of what constitutes the “source code” of film is

1 different from what infrastructures enable the circulation of film through
2 standardized, open channels (e.g. the existence of cinemas, for instance, or
3 of videotape and DVD players).

4 What is the “infrastructure of nanotechnology? Here much of the
5 infrastructure overlaps, in the form of the Internet and the standard PC
6 architecture, which allow for the circulation of information about chemistry,
7 physics, or engineering in much the same manner as software is circulated.
8 However, a recipe is only as good as the cook, so such circulation relies on
9 the existence and interest of other chemists or nanotechnologists, be they
10 experts or novices, who are familiar with the “tacit” components of
11 executing a recipe (Collins, 1992). As in the case of software, where there is a
12 great deal of nonexplicit expertise required to get software to work, the
13 largest challenge for an open source nanotechnology will be finding the most
14 “open” infrastructure whereby people all over the world might be able to
15 easily replicate the recipes created in high-tech laboratories.

17

18 *Free Software Licenses Help Manage the Complex*
19 *Legal Relations of Collaborative Creation*

21 Free software licenses are well known because of the way that they cleverly
22 invert the strong rights granted through copyright law. Copyright law,
23 which is broadly applicable in the domain of software, automatically grants
24 creators rights to copy, distribute, reproduce, modify, perform, or display
25 the material. It also gives them the right to license this work to others. While
26 all FOSS is copyrighted (a common misconception is that FOSS is anti-
27 copyright), it does not insist on “all rights reserved” (see O’Mahony, 2003).
28 Instead, free software is made available with a very minimal set of
29 restrictions, which usually include only the requirement of attribution (so
30 called BSD-style licenses), and in stronger cases, the requirement that
31 subsequent users offer their modifications on the same terms (GPL-style
32 licenses, also called share-alike, reciprocal, or viral licenses). There are two
33 reasons for using free software licenses. The first is that many in FOSS want
34 to see software be freely available because it enhances the liberty and
35 freedom of individuals to experiment with and transform the software they
36 use; the second is that such licensing actually lubricates the circulation of
37 software, and facilitates the widespread re-use, testing, and improvement of
38 software. Most software projects rely instead on *trademark law* to maintain
39 the identity of their “property” without interfering with the rights of others
to take the material in new directions.

1 The Linux operating system kernel, one of the most well-known FOSS
2 projects is exemplary in this respect. It uses the GPL license, which demands
3 that re-uses or modifications of the Linux kernel be offered under the same
4 terms. There is only one Linux kernel project however, because of the strong
5 incentives created to contribute back to this project, rather than “forking” a
6 new project (Weber, 2005; Raymond, 2001). In addition, trademark
7 protection around the name Linux, which is very loosely policed, seeks to
8 prevent derived works from being confused with the original project. Patent
9 law, by contrast, is not explicitly invoked in FOSS, although it is an area of
10 deep concern, given the ease with which it is possible to infringe on software
11 patents that make broad claims. Contributors to the project are asked to
12 ensure that their contributions do not infringe on known patents.

13 Licensing nanotechnology data and recipes is trivial where copyright is
14 concerned, thanks to the existence of FOSS. Numerous different licenses
15 (such as the Creative Commons licenses) are easily available. Where the
16 challenges are greater is with respect to patents, which are much more
17 common in the various fields of chemistry, physics, and engineering than
18 they are in software, and harder to work around. As yet, there is no
19 standard open source patent license, though in principle, such a thing is
20 possible.

21

22 *FOSS Requires Tools for Managing and Facilitating Contributions*

25 Although it is popular to imagine that FOSS relies on a form of emergent
26 self-organization to create software, there are actually a number of concrete
27 ways in which FOSS projects manage the creation of software. Many of
28 these are already familiar to modern organizations, but differ in this case
29 because of their entirely voluntary character. FOSS relies on governance
30 schemes of various sorts: individual “benevolent dictatorship” as in the case
31 of Linux, structured oligarchy as in the case of the Apache Foundation, or
32 hierarchies of various sorts (see O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007). In addition,
33 software tools like mailing lists, bug tracking systems, and most importantly
34 source code management (SCM) tools allow for a minimalistic approach to
35 management, and combine technical and social forms of coordination into a
36 meaningful technical practice available to all volunteers.

37 One can categorize various FOSS and FOSS-like projects by the kinds of
38 technical and social forms of governance they use. Wikipedia, for instance,
39 disavows any explicit form of governance, and instead relies entirely on the
40 technology to mediate disputes and resolve differences. Anyone can

1 contribute or make a change without asking permission. Over time, some
2 long-term contributors develop credibility and reputation to which new
3 entrants often defer, and which has developed into a recognized hierarchy.
4 Order in Wikipedia emerges through the kinds of social interactions that
5 persist throughout the life of an entry, and through the continued
6 interactions of users. Linux, by contrast has a very highly ordered hierarchy
7 of responsibilities, and while anyone can propose changes, or make changes
8 and redistribute them on their own, only a limited number make it into the
9 official release of Linux. This kind of order also developed through the
10 course of the project, but there has always been an explicit hierarchy of
11 decision-making about which contributions to include. Other projects, like
12 the Apache Webserver, or the Perl scripting language, have developed yet
13 other systems of governance and coordination.

14 The success of coordination also relies to a large extent on the design
15 strategy, and background knowledge of participants. Projects that are
16 highly modularized, clearly documented, and which encourage extensibility
17 from a core, are often much more successful than those that have a
18 monolithic top-down design strategy. Similarly, most FOSS projects are re-
19 inventions of established technologies (Linux replicates UNIX, Open Office
20 replicates Microsoft Word), which means that projects can rely on a base of
21 design and engineering expertise regarding how to build such objects.
22 Similarly the success of Wikipedia rests on the widespread recognition of the
23 encyclopedia entry as an established and well-developed form of writing.
24 Creating something fundamentally new poses challenges in FOSS as much
25 as in any other realm.

26 The challenges and resources for collaboration in software are easily
27 transported to the domain of nanotechnology, but remain no less daunting.
28 An open source nanotechnology project needs constant communication,
29 clear leadership, clear goals for its participants, a liberal sharing of credit and
30 attribution of contributions, and a clever use of available software tools for
31 keeping information updated, responsive, noncontradictory as well as legal
32 and safe. There is much to learn from how successful FOSS projects manage
33 collaboration among volunteers, but very little of it is well codified to date.

35

FOSS is a Social Movement, Not an Organization

37

38 Particular projects can be organized in different ways, often as a result of
39 different goals and strategies. However, participants are often deeply
sensitive to the difference between a free and open project and one that is

1 not. A key reason for this, and a key component of the movement, is
2 dialogue – participants talk to and learn from and argue with one another
3 continuously and do so in open forums – mailing lists, bulletin boards,
4 publications, and so forth. As they do so, they develop more and more
5 sophisticated understandings of the four practices listed above. The fact that
6 there are two names, free software and open source software, was largely a
7 result of this kind of dialogue. In 1998, when IBM and Netscape were
8 convinced to release some of their software as free software, a group of the
9 more high-profile hackers and programmers and supporters of free software
10 – Eric Raymond, Bruce Perens, Tim O’Reilly, and others – made a bid to re-
11 brand free software as open source in order to appeal more broadly to the
12 business and investment climate of the dot-com era (DiBona & Ockman,
13 1999; Kelty, 2008). Neither term has become ubiquitous, and both have
14 enthusiastic supporters, even though there is no practical difference between
15 the two with regard to the four practices outlined above.

16 Over time, the five components of FOSS have captured the attention of
17 people in domains far from software programming. Different groups have
18 tried to apply bits and pieces in different ways. The aforementioned Creative
19 Commons has perhaps been the most visible and successful; it was created
20 primarily by lawyers (Lawrence Lessig and James Boyle), not hackers or
21 programmers, and has created a global dialogue about the problems of
22 intellectual property law, the challenges and promises of “remix culture,”
23 and the need for clarity in legal terms. The licenses they provide are applied
24 to a wide variety of cultural productions, but principally digital text, audio,
25 and video. A related project that emerged at the same time was The
26 Connexions project at Rice University, which seeks to create a repository of
27 openly licensed, collaboratively authored textbooks for use in education.
28 Connexions replaces “source code” with “textbook modules” (short
29 chapters or lessons), uses Creative Commons licenses, and tries to encourage
30 communities of scholars to work collaboratively on and re-use material in
31 the Connexions repository (Henry, Baraniuk, & Kelty, 2003).

32 Other projects have drawn inspiration from FOSS without necessarily
33 transferring all of the practices. “Open Access,” for instance, is a movement
34 to improve access to scientific and scholarly work, and while it takes the form
35 of a movement, and may promote the use of free software-style licenses, it
36 does not challenge the conventional forms of collaborative production in the
37 sciences or humanities, only the process by which the results are made
38 available (Suber, 2002; Harnad et al., 2004). Other supposed uses of FOSS
39 principles may share nothing but the name, such as “Open Source yoga”
which was primarily an anti-Bikram Yoga movement that objected to the

1 idea that yoga poses might be the intellectual property of an individual or
corporation (Fish, 2007).

3 Finally, movements cannot be created – they emerge from the interactions
of people who share a set of goals and ideals, but are free to voluntarily
5 contribute and to become leaders if they wish to. In many ways, the success
of FOSS has depended on it being independent of both the university and
7 the commercial world, free to evolve and maintain its own identity without
being owned by one or another. This is perhaps the greatest challenge for
9 open source nanotechnology. Universities and corporations foster a very
strong sense of both formal and informal ownership of ideas and successes
11 (both through norms of competition and through intellectual property rules
as well), creating an environment in which it is difficult to share credit
13 widely. Without taking that step, the invitation to the wider world to
participate will fall on deaf ears.

17 **TOWARD OPEN SOURCE NANO: MAGNETITE**
19 **NANOCRYSTALS FOR ARSENIC**
21 **REMOVAL (AND BEYOND)**

21 The OS Nano project we report on here currently consists of only one case of
23 research in nanotechnology: synthesizing magnetite nanocrystals, potentially
useful for removing arsenic from water (see <http://opensourcenano.net>). We
25 briefly review the specifics of this technology (a full recipe can be found on
the website) followed by a discussion of the challenges for the development of
27 opens source approaches to nanotechnology.

29 The goal of the OS Nano Magnetite project is to enable widespread access
to technological know-how that can address pressing social problems such as
removing arsenic from water to make it potable. Magnetite nanocrystals may
31 have an array of uses not limited to arsenic removal; however, the project
differs in some crucial ways from similar efforts to provide “appropriate
33 technology” to developing nations. In terms of the older, linear model of
development, OS Nano is inviting people to participate very far “upstream”
35 in the process, by communicating with scientists who have sought to make
the process easier to perform outside of the relatively elite and scarce labs of
37 research universities. In terms of a richer “hybridized” model of innovation,
what OS Nano offers, is the chance to introduce feedback loops into research
39 that includes direct engagement with potential users of a technology even as
it is being invented, refined, developed, and deployed.

1 The specific technological innovation we describe involves the process of
2 synthesizing magnetite nanocrystals (Fe_3O_4). Magnetite (along with its
3 crystal sister maghemite ($\gamma\text{-Fe}_2\text{O}_3$)) have been extensively studied because of
4 their unique and tunable magnetic properties (Cornell & Schwertmann,
5 2003). Their magnetic features have found widespread use in applications as
6 diverse as environmental remediation, magnetic recording, and magnetic
7 resonance imaging (Tartaj, Morales, Veintemillas-Verdaguer, Gonzalez-
8 Carreno, & Serna, 2003). What makes magnetite nanocrystals different from
9 normal magnetite is that the size of each of the individual crystals is
10 precisely controlled during the synthesis of the crystals. Which is to say,
11 these magnetite crystals are *made*, not found in nature, and as a result we
12 can control some of their properties, such as producing a regular size, in
13 order to take advantage of their magnetic properties. In order to test the
14 materials and to develop these properties, it is necessary to produce large
15 amounts of identically sized and shaped particles of magnetite (i.e., they
16 must be “monodisperse”), generally having diameters from 10 to 25 nm.
17 This gives them large and permanent magnetic dipole moments (Kryszewski
18 & Jeszka, 1998).

19 There are currently four different laboratory methods for synthesizing
20 magnetite nanocrystals in nonaqueous solutions. The method we employ is
21 called the “solvothermal decomposition of iron oxide hydrate in the
22 presence of oleic acid” (Yu, Falkner, Yavuz, & Colvin, 2004). The method is
23 simple, requiring only one step and three reagents, whereas the others (Jana,
24 Chen, & Peng, 2004; Park et al., 2004; Sun & Zeng, 2002) employ either
25 multiple steps or five or more reagents. All of the methods are costly,
26 however, rendering them unfeasible in a large, multi kilogram scale
27 applications such as water treatment and arsenic removal (Yavuz, 2006;
28 Yean et al., 2005; Mayo et al., 2007).

29 An alternative approach to reducing cost without sacrificing quality is
30 simply to replace the costly reagents with less pure ones. This is the strategy
31 we chose – the “vernacularization” of the synthesis method. We replaced
32 iron oxide hydrate with rust and high-grade oleic acid with a fatty-acid
33 mixture made from household cooking oil, drain cleaner, and vinegar.
34 Table 1 shows the 100-fold decrease from the original synthesis to the
35 affordable, green synthesis route (see Woodhouse, 2006 for a discussion of
36 the limited development of green chemistry in nanoscience).

37 In the field of nanotechnology there are currently few existing green and
38 affordable synthesis methods. Sapra, Rogach, and Feldmann (2006) used
39 olive oil and terminol 66 (Asokan et al., 2005) as the solvent to create
40 cadmium selenide (CdSe) nanocrystals. As they report, the quality of the

Table 1. Cost Comparison of the Synthesis of Magnetite Nanocrystals with Pure Lab Chemicals and the Everyday Chemicals.

AU :1

Pure Lab Chemicals		Everyday Chemicals	
Chemical	Price per kg	Chemical	Price per kg
FeOOH	\$778.00	Rust	\$0.20*
Oleic acid	\$20.60	Edible oil (coconut oil)	\$0.25
1-Octadecene	\$24.75	Crystal drain opener (NaOH)	\$1.24
		Vinegar	\$0.65
Magnetite nanocrystals	\$2,624.00	Magnetite nanocrystals	\$21.7





Fig. 1. Mechanism of the Solvothermal Decomposition of Iron Oleate for Magnetite Nanocrystals. Inset is a Picture from the Batch Setup.

nanocrystals remained the same, but the cost was drastically reduced. Based on previous work (Yu et al., 2004; Jana, Chen, & Peng, 2004; Park et al., 2004; Sun & Zeng, 2002), we discovered that a major intermediate is iron (III) oleate (a direct salt of iron (III) with oleate anions). Fig. 1 shows a schematic outline of the reaction.

1 By exploring the details of this theory of the synthesis of magnetite, we
 3 were able to propose replacements for the key ingredients. Rust (collected
 5 from any available source, in our case on the Rice University campus) is a
 7 perfectly affordable, nearly free replacement for FEOOH, which is the iron
 9 precursor we used in the lab. Similarly, household oils combined with lye,
 or drain cleaner can produce soap (a common household chemical reaction

11 In a typical green synthesis route, we first produce soap from the edible
 13 oils. One could also use nonedible triglycerides since triglyceride is one of
 15 the essential ingredients. The recipe is relatively simple, and a detailed
 17 version can be found on the website. First, we make soap using oil and
 crystal drain opener (or potash). It takes about 15 min to make the mixture,
 and a couple of days to a week for the soap to dry and cure.

19 Once the soap is made, it could be used for normal household cleaning
 21 purposes (though making soap that doesn't dry your skin is obviously a fine
 23 art!). We use it here for making the FAM. We used a cheese grater to grind
 25 the soap and mixed it with the white vinegar and heated it until it dissolved



39 Fig. 2. Four Major Fatty Acids that are Mostly Found in the Oils. Twelve of Oil
 Types Contain these 90% (w/w) or More (Gan Food Chemistry).

1 (it boils and takes about 15–30 min). When the solution cools, two layers
 3 form: the top more yellowish layer is separated, using a funnel, or fat
 5 separator (or a spoon, syringe, etc.) into a clean glass/steel jar. Further
 heating and boiling clears the yellowish cloudy solution to produce the
 7 FAM. Fig. 3 shows the entire chemical scheme for the production of FAM.




Fig. 3. Production of Fatty Acid Mixture (FAM) from a Triglyceride.

1 The remaining ingredient needed was rust. Rust was collected by shaving
off rusted tools and metal objects and ground into fine powder. The rust is
3 mixed with the FAM and once again cooked. This stage produces smoke
and steam, so it is best done under some kind of ventilation hood or outside.
5 The mixture is cooked for 2 h until achieving a fully black, waxy, sticky mess
with little or no further smoking. With this setup, 50–90 nm nanocrystals
7 were achieved but if 15–20 nm nanocrystals were desired a steam/pressure
cooker is suggested.

9 Since the magnetite crystals we are using are intended to be used for
removing arsenic from water, making the crystals waterborne is an
11 important step. We achieved this by mixing the waxy black deposit into
soapy water, then filtering the water. At this point, the nanocrystals could be
13 separated from the water by using a magnet, washing them with water or
alcohol, resulting in the final product of pure nanocrystal magnetite of
15 regular size. The entire process of magnetite nanocrystals synthesis is shown
in Fig. 4. Results show that the crystals produced in the kitchen are
17 comparable to lab synthesis using expensive chemicals (see Fig. 5). The
resultant crystals can then be used to absorb arsenic in water. Selected as
19 one of Esquire magazine's *six ideas that will change the world*, this
technology requires no electricity or manufacturing infrastructure, enabling
21 those at the bottom of the pyramid to easily and efficiently purify water at
point-of-use (Ajudua, 2007).

23

25

Challenges for OS Nano

27 This case exemplifies the challenge of finding an “open infrastructure” for
nanoscience and nanotechnology. The fundamental insight in this case was
29 that that recipes and procedures that are possible in the lab need to be made
“vernacular” – widely accessible, simplified, and transferable to multiple
31 contexts. By transforming the recipe from something that requires access to
a high-tech, expensive laboratory in an elite university, to something that
33 can be conducted in nearly any kitchen around the world, OS Nano's
magnetite project takes a huge step toward facilitating the core of a FOSS
35 model: the ability to download, tinker, change bits and pieces, and
contribute the changes back to the project. But this is also a point of
37 important difference: there is no strict equivalent to the standard PC
architecture for nanotechnology, so any given OS Nano project needs to
39 identify and exploit the most standard possible infrastructure in order to be
widely re-usable. In the case of magnetite production, this infrastructure is





Fig. 4. Scheme of the Synthetic Process. (a) Ingredients for a Typical Nanocrystal Synthesis Include: Oil, Vinegar, Pan, Crystal Drain Opener™, and rust. (b–c) Synthesis Begins with Soapmaking. For This the Oil is Mixed with Crystal Drain Opener and Water. (d) After Curing for a Day the Soap Solidifies. (e) For Efficient Dissolution in Subsequent Steps, the Soap is Ground to a Fine Powder, (f) Then Mixed with Vinegar (g–h) While Heating on a Stove. (i–j) Once all the Soap is Dissolved the Solution Forms Two Layers: A Yellow Top Layer and a Cloudy White/Yellow Bottom Layer. (k) The Top Layer is the Fatty Acid Mixture (FAM). This Needs to be Heated at 110°C to Remove Excess Water and Vinegar By-Products. (l) Clear Yellow FAM is Collected. (m–n) Rust was Scraped off of Rusted Metals and was Ground to a Fine Powder. (o) FAM and Rust were Mixed. (p–q) Mixture was Heated for 2h at Below and Near Boiling Temperatures. The Temperature was Measured Using a Standard Mercury Thermometer. (r–s) Magnetite (Black) Began to Form. (t) TEM Micrograph was Obtained After Magnetic Separation in Chloroform. Scale Bar is 50 nm.

literally the kitchen (or more generally, tools, materials, and machines available at the broadest consumer level).

In terms of licensing, the recipe itself is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license, which allows both commercial and non-commercial exploitation of the recipe. The difficult part of the project, however, is the relatively more important influence of patents in chemistry,



13 *Fig. 5. Magnetite Nanocrystal Synthesis from FeOOH in the Lab Versus the*
15 *Kitchen.*

17 biology, and engineering. Whereas FOSS does not employ patents, and
19 seeks primarily to avoid infringing on them, engineers, TTOs at universities
21 and corporations are extremely likely to patent widely, and aim to make
23 broad claims in the patents they file. This creates two classes of patents that
25 threaten the success of OS Nano: the first are those patents that the recipe
27 infringes upon, if any; the second is the patent on the procedure itself. In the
former case, if the recipe infringes on existing patents, the onus is on OS
Nano to find an alternate procedure. The strategy of “vernacularization”
serves well in this instance, since it seeks to identify not only a widely
available set of materials and processes, but hopefully those that are not
covered by patents as well. In other cases, there may be no feasible way
around a patented procedure, vernacular or otherwise.

29 In terms of any patents on the recipe itself, a licensing scheme similar to
31 that of the BSD-style licenses can be employed, which grants anyone
commercial or noncommercial rights to employ the process. If, however,
33 one wanted to replicate the function of the GPL-style license (reciprocal,
share-alike licenses), it would be necessary to grant the right to the patent
35 contingent on the requirement that any infringing use of the patent would
also be released under similar terms. To date, there are no examples of such
37 patent licensing schemes, and given the costs associated with simply filing, it
creates an incentive to commercialize the procedure in order to recoup costs,
rather than distributing it widely. With regard to coordination, the major
39 challenge to OS Nano’s magnetite project is in finding collaborators willing
to experiment with the recipe and to help improve it. The recipe itself can be

1 managed in the same way that source code is, using software that allows for
2 updating and versioning of text. The governance of the project at the outset
3 is extremely open, since the project seeks primarily to disseminate the
4 process, and has as yet no need of a mechanism for solving disputes, or
5 determining which kinds of changes to the recipe to allow. Historically, such
6 governance structures in FOSS have evolved more or less organically along
7 with the software, and there is reason to follow this lead in order to maintain
8 maximum flexibility.

9 Finally, there is as yet no “open source nanotechnology movement” since
10 there is not yet any open source nanotechnology. However, such a
11 movement is perforce a result and not a precursor of an experiment such
12 as OS Nano. Generating interest in an open source magnetite nanocrystal
13 recipe will require active work to find those people interested in partici-
14 pating, rather than simply expecting a world of eager contributors to emerge
15 from the Internet.

17 CONCLUSION

18
19 OS Nano and the magnetite project are in the experimental stage, but they
20 emerge out of and draw on debates and practices that stretch back at least
21 20 years, and which are a response to the changing conditions in which
22 science and technology are pursued today, after Bayh-Dole, after the growth
23 of biotechnology, after the dot-com boom and the spread of the Internet.
24 The questions they raise go straight to the heart of how we conceive of
25 innovation, and more generally the relationship of scientific knowledge
26 production to its effective use, and commercialization, in the world at large.

27 The OS Nano project envisioned here raises two separate points for
28 discussion: the first is how much of FOSS is necessary for OS Nano to be
29 successful? and the second is will a successful OS Nano translate into a
30 successful alternative to conventional technology transfer? The first question
31 can only be answered experimentally, as part of the process of creating and
32 promoting OS Nano itself. The second question is the one we dwell on here
33 at more length.

34 First off, what metrics should one use to measure the success of FOSS?
35 There is of course, no reason to stop measuring success in terms of profit and
36 revenue, but in the case of FOSS, that revenue is not tied directly to patent
37 and copyright portfolios. The value chain created by FOSS creates new
38 possibilities for revenue at other levels such as service, support, customiza-
39 tion, and certain forms of value-added innovation, all of which can produce

1 measurable revenue, if one discovers ways to capture and track that revenue
2 other than by relying on the monopoly grant of intellectual property.

3 The value that FOSS creates, as we have mentioned, is not in the direct
4 revenue from IPR, but the model by which its innovations are widely
5 adopted and used, and through which individuals and institutions receive
6 credit and a form of social capital that institutions and corporations are
7 slowly learning to measure. For most scientists and engineers, there is more
8 satisfaction in knowing that their innovations are being widely used, and
9 that their name is associated with that innovation, than there is in a yearly
10 royalty check from a patent.

11 Nonetheless, it is possible, though difficult, to continue to use patents as a
12 metric even in a FOSS-inspired model. However, what would count is not
13 revenue from patents so much as the *number of users of a patent*. If TTOs
14 experimented with ways to freely (or at least very, very cheaply and easily)
15 license the patents they hold, on the condition that subsequent uses credit
16 the inventor and/or the university, they could begin to measure impact in a
17 different way. This requires, of course, that patents be licensed nonexclusively.¹ In this way, TTOs might also be able to measure different uses of
18 one patent – some for commercial purposes which fulfills a university’s
19 mission, even if the revenue generated does not return directly to the
20 university, and some for the social justice, environmental or health uses that
21 the process or product fulfills. In contrast to prevailing patenting practices
22 that seek licensing deals that necessitate contractual obligations to produce
23 revenue and royalties (or else languishing in a corporate patent profile until
24 they expire), the FOSS model at least opens up the possibility for using
25 patents as a kind of innovation measurement tool.

AU :3

27 Another issue raised by the analysis presented here is how to capture the
28 value of the “lateral transfer of knowledge” – the case where two different
29 users of a technology learn from each other, because of a shared problem or
30 context, rather than a measurable flow of knowledge among designated and
31 contracted entities. Lateral transfer of knowledge is at the heart of FOSS
32 innovation, because there is no requirement to ask permission, or to go
33 through a principal in order to make a change or improvement in a
34 technology; additionally there is an incentive to contribute the knowledge
35 gained in these local contexts back to a global project, under the theory that
36 there may be others who can learn from it as well. Such an activity is too
37 context-driven and too dispersed to yield large revenues, but is a practice
38 that is actually prevented by the current IP system.

39 Finally, in terms of metrics for use and re-use (rather than revenue and
40 royalty), a FOSS model encourages TTOs to pursue more than one path at

1 once. In the world of patents, the only thing that matters is the exclusive
3 license, so TTOs are betting on a single licensee to commercialize and make
5 a success out of a university's work. In an open source model, TTOs can bet
7 on many horses. Some might yield revenue, but more likely because of the
9 requirement of attribution, they will yield social capital and recognition
11 (Goode, 1978).

13 Many proponents of the existing system like to imagine that we live in a
15 world where the patent system works well, if not seamlessly. In this model,
17 all knowledge is patented, and if you need someone else's knowledge, you
19 simply purchase it, and the more valuable it is, the more expensive it is. But
21 in practice, the system doesn't always work this way. Instead it can lock up
23 knowledge in 20-year chunks, force negotiations for even the most trivial of
25 uses, and force people to work around what they cannot purchase. FOSS
27 models provide an alternative that not only creates better possibilities for
29 socially valuable uses of knowledge, but might also contribute to a more
31 competitive innovation-based economy. In addition, it can open up
33 important discussions about the nature of the university as well as how to
35 maximize societal impact in a way that takes seriously the reality of societal
37 and global inequalities.

NOTE

1. It is possible, even in this case, to imagine a way to "have one's cake and eat it too": TTOs could employ a dual-licensing strategy, in which all the patents are nonexclusively licensed with a GPL-like restriction (i.e., if you want to use this patent, your use of it also has to be openly licensed). If a corporation wanted to avoid this requirement, they could then re-negotiate a separate non-GPL license for a fee. Such a strategy would provide a way to collect licensing fees from multiple users, rather than negotiating only one, complex, exclusive, royalty-sharing license. It could increase the possible benefits of the patent, because multiple parties can compete to commercialize it, and if they see no incentive to, neither the TTO nor any corporation has lost any money on the patent, which is still freely available for them to use.

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